In many online price negotiations, instant messaging (IM) and audio channels rival each other in use, but IM's use is on the rise. In these contexts, people who are strangers to each other are inclined to act more competitively. They are driven by self-interest and strive for greater gains from agreement in the form of what is termed Òending concessions.Ó To date, however, researchers have focused on striving for agreement as the main goal of negotiators. This study uses a selfishness theory to explain how individuals using IM, as compared to those using audio, can encourage their negotiation partners to make ending concessions, and thereby increase individuals' gains when agreement is reached. We use data from a negotiation laboratory experiment to test a model of ending concessions that is predicted by unrestricted offers and comments that negotiators make over IM and audio. We base our analyses on the contents of the resulting communications. The objects of negotiation are simulated lottery tickets. Our results provide three key insights. First, when using IM, partners appear to interpret offers that include concessions from individuals as attempts to manipulate partners into accepting non-equitable agreements; as a result partners decrease their ending concessions. These interpretations do not appear to occur when using audio, and as a result individuals' concessions do not decrease partners' ending concessions. Second, using IM, when individuals disagree with anger directed at partners' bidding behaviors, partners respond by increasing their ending concessions. Ending concessions are further increased when using audio. Third, and in contrast, using IM, when individuals disagree with emotion that does not include anger, partners respond by decreasing their ending concessions. Ending concessions are further decreased when using audio. These insights provide guidance for practice, and are bases for future research on the use of IM and audio for negotiation. > >
Virtual worlds have received considerable attention as platforms for entertainment, education, and commerce. But organizations are experiencing failures in their early attempts to lure customers, employees, or partners into these worlds. Among the more grievous problems is the inability to attract users back into a virtual environment. In this study, we propose and test a model to predict users' intentions to return to a virtual world. Our model is based on the idea that users intend to return to a virtual world having conceived of it as a "place" in which they have had meaningful experiences. We rely on the interactionist theory of place attachment to explain the links among the constructs of our model. Our model is tested via a lab experiment. We find that users' intentions to return to a virtual world is determined by a state of deep involvement (termed cognitive absorption) that users experience as they perform an activity and tend to lose track of time. In turn, cognitive absorption is determined by users' awareness of whom they interact with and how they interact within a virtual world, what they interact about, and where, in a virtual sense, such interaction occurs. Our work contributes to theory in the following ways: it identifies state predictors of cognitive absorption, it conceives of virtual worlds in such a way as to account for users' experiences through the notion of place, and it explains how the properties of a virtual world contribute to users' awareness.
Negotiation is increasingly being conducted over computer media, such as e-mail and instant messaging, because of the potential for time savings and monetary benefits. However, these media can affect negotiators' behaviors as they engage in what is called concession making, which is a process by which they make offers that yield benefits to their opponents. In this paper, we focus on how and why conducting negotiations via computer media can affect this process, especially when negotiators have unequal power. Our research model is based on theories from the information systems, negotiation, and social psychology literatures. Via a laboratory experiment, we find that concessions made by the first individual to make an offer (the first mover) were not typically reciprocated by his/her negotiating opponent (the second mover). Thus, in the context of computer-mediated negotiation, it appears that second movers are, among other things, more likely to violate the well-established norm of reciprocity. This can result in significant disadvantages for the first mover, independent of power differences between negotiators. In addition, we find that, contrary to face-to-face negotiations, increased power of one negotiator resulted in his/her having less influence in terms of getting larger concessions from the other negotiator. In general, these findings support the notion that computer-mediated negotiation can be significantly different than face-to-face negotiation.